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Protection and the Product Line:
Monopoly and Product Quality
ABSTRACT
Thereare three points made in this paper. The first is that the
question concerning choice of a product line by a monopolist is similar
in structure to other adverse selection problems —andcan be analyzed
in an elementary way by adapting techniques recently developed for such
problems. Such an analysis is developed in the first section.
Thesecond is that when a foreign monopolist produces a product
line, protection will change the composition of the entire product line.
The nature of such effects Is studied in the second section and this
analysis is greatly simplified by the results of the first sectton. In
line with empirical work on the subject, quotas are shown to raise the
average quality of imports, while the effects of tariffs are ambiguous.
The third concerns the possibility of profit shifting protection
which is welfare increasing. The welfare consequences of protection are
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Introduction
This paper deals with the effects of protection on the product line
selected by a foreign monppolist, on his pricing policy for the product
line, and therefore on national welfare. While trade restrictions tend
to raise domestic prices, harm consumers, and thereby lower national wel-
fare, they also transfer profits from the foreign monopolist to the govern-
ment in the form of revenues collected. This raises national welfare.
This profit shifting motive for trade restrictions has aroused considerable
interest lately.1 This paper explores the possibilities for such welfare
increasing profit shifting, in the scenario where the foreign producer
decideson a pricing policy for the entire product line.
Existing work in the trade literature on the effects of trade restric-
tions with endogenous quality focuses mainly on the nature of these effects
in a competitive world. The specifications of the models are therefore
particularly suited to the perfectly competitive paradigm. Unfortunately,
they also tend to, obscure some significant aspects of firm behavior in an
imperfectlycompetitive world.
Falvey(1979) considers the effect of trade restrictions on the pro-
duct line. He argues that specific tariffs and quotas raise the quality
composition of imports, while ad—valorem tariffs do not. The essence of
his argument is that prices are closely related to costs. Specific tar-
iffs, or quotas implemented by thesale of licenses, raise allprices by—2—
the same amount. Thus, the relative price of higher quality goods
falls. If relative demand depends inversely on relative price, the re-
lative demand for higher quality products rises and this raisesthe
quality composition of imports. Ad—valorem tariffs do not changerela-
tive prices and so have rio effect on the composition of imports.
While the argument is relatively plausible in the context of a
competitivemarket structure, it is less so when market power on the
part of the producer exists. In such cases,the prices of goods of
differentqualities must beset together to allow the producer to discrim-
inatebetween consumers. It is therefore essential to study the pricing
ofan entire product line, as is done in this paper.
The idea that a monopolist mightwant toproduce aproduct line is
capturedby allowing the monopolist to differentiate his products. I
assumethatthere is a continuum of products, indexed by their quality,
whichare "vertically" differentiated. By thisI mean that while all
consumersagree on the ranking of the products in terms of their quality,
they choose to buy different qualities because of their differing prefer-
ences over income and the products.
The kind of protection I will consider is a uniform ad—valoremor
specifictariff (or a quota implemented by the sale of licenses as dis-
cussed in Krishna (1984)) on the entire product line, This is a common
feature of trade restrictions as they are usually imposed on broad catego-
riesof products since quality is not costlessly observable by the govern—
ment, as well as for reasonsofadministrative convenience.
The monopoly pricing problem2 wasfirstsolved by MussaandRosen
(1978) .Asthe monopolist's problem is that of maximizing profits by—3—
choosinga price quality function, the problem is one of maximization
in an infinite dimensional space. Even though they ass tune that allcon-
sumerseitherpurchase one unitofsomegoodor none, andaspecific
utility function,the analysis is nonetheless quite complicated. Ipre-
sent an elementary analysis of their problem for a slightly more general
utility function. The technique is basedon thework of Myerson (1981)
andBaron and Myerson (1982).The simplicity of the techniqueallows me
to consider the effect of parameter changes on the solution and therefore
on welfare. In particular, I analyze the effects of a quota and tariff
on the profit maximizing choice of the monopolist. In addition, the
wlfareeffects ofbotha smallquota andtariffare calculated. I show
thata quota doesnotaffect thequalitychosen by eachtypeof consumer,
but removes consumers with a low valuation of quality who purchase low
quality products, from themarket,and raises thepriceof all qualities
by the same amount. Thus, average quality rises. A tariff, on the other
hand, lowers the quality chosen by each consumer, thus reducingaverage
quality.Inaddition, itremovesconsumerswitha low valuation of quality
from the market, whichtendsto raise average quality. The effect on
average quality is therefore ambiguous.
Inaddition, I show thatthe effect on welfare,ofa slightly
restrictive quota, or amall specific tax on imports, depends on the
distribution of constuners and the market served by the monopolist. When
constuners,indexed by e, aredistributed as f(8) ,and0* is the
marginal constuner, who is indifferent between purchasing and not
purchasing, then as long as 1f) > ,pricesrise by less than
the specific tariff and elf are increases, The reason is that whilethe marginal consumer is removed from the market by the imposition of
thespecialtariff, he derives no-surplus and this does not affect
welfare. However, the government collects more in revenue than con-
atmrs pay due to increased prices as the increase in price is less
thanthe specific tariff. This shifts part of the foreign monopolist's
profits into the hands of the government, which raises national welfare.
The welfare effects of an ad—valorem tariff are less easy to
interpret because the quality chosen by each consumerisaffected by
thetariff.Although the direct effect on welfare of an increase in t
isshown to be beneficial, the tariff always causes a lower qualityto
be purchased by individuals in the market and decreases the size of the
market. These effects are shown to be harmful and the total effect of
a tariff on welfare is aithiguous.—5—
Section 1
The Problem
The odel I viii present here is basically that of )4issa and Rosen
(1979).There is a continuum of consumers, indexed by 8 •Thedistri-
bution of 8 is given by f(8) ,whichis assumed to be continuous and
differentiable over [80, 8] C R+ ,therange of 8 •Allconsumers
either purchase one unit of the good or none. a1ity is indexed by
,withhighervalues of q denoting higher qualities. There is a
constant marginal cotof producing a unit of output of qualityq
given by c(q) ,whichis assumed to be increasing and strictly convex
in q •Theconsumer of type 8 derives utility U(8,q) from con—
suming the good of quality q •Iassume that U(e,q) —Oh(q)+g(q)+n,
wheren" is the constmiption of a competitively produced numeraire
good. It is assumed that h,g > 0 ,h',g'> 0 , < 0 ,sothat
the utility function is non—negative, increasing and concave. Consumers
have an endowment, I ,ofthe numeraire good and maximize expected
utility, subject to their budget constraint.
The monopolist. is aware of the distribution of 8,andof the
preferences of all types of consumers. However, he is unable to
directly identify consumers by their types. Thus, he cannot choose his
allocation to consumers on the basis of their "type" unless the alloca-
tion offered to each type of consumer is actually his choiceamong all
possible allocations offered. In other words, the problem may be posed
as a maximization problem, subject to the usual self selection and indi-
vidual rationality constraints.—6
Theallocation,A(8) ,assignedtoa cooser of type 0is
assedto conit of atriple, <p(O), q(8), *(e)>wherep is the
price,q is thequality,and •itheprobability of getting the
goodof the given quality at the given price. It will becomeapparent
that•hasonlya notational role.
LetS(e/8) denotethe surplusofthe conster of type 0 with
theallocation A(0) .Bydefinition
(8/e)— [u(0,q(6))p($)J$(6)





Inaddition, individual rationality, requires that:
(1.2) s(8)0 0[0, e]
sinceconsters cannot be forced to be in the market. Finally, as
is a probability:
(1.3) 0 (9) 1 8.['01]
An allocation, A(8)<p(e), q(0), 4(e)> ,issaid to be"feasible"if
it satisfies conditions (1,1),(1.2)and (1,3). The monopolist has to
find the feasible policy that maximizes his profits. Such a policy is
constructed in the next section.Section 2
The Solution
The solution is derived by using a series of lemmas which allow the
profit function of the monopolist to be written in a form where the
solution to the problem is apparent by inspectIon. The solution
technique is based on the rk of Baron and Myerson (1982). The first
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allocation.
Lemma 2.1: An allocation Is feasible, if and only if, it satisfies the
following conditions for all 0 c [00,011
(2.1) 04(8)i
e




Proof: First we show that conditions (1.l)—(L3) imply conditions
(2.1)-(2.4). Condition (1.1) requires that:
(8/8) )s(8/0) ,0c [00, 81)
Subtracting s(8/8) from both sides and simplifying yields
(2.5) s(e)— s(8)(8 —8)h(q(9))(@)—B--
performing the se operation withthe rolesof 8 and 0 reversed
shows that:
(2.6) s(8) —s(6))(6—8)h(q(8))(9)
Combining (2.5) and (2.6) gives:
(2.7) (8 —8)h(q(8))(6))s(O)—s(6)(6 -O)h(q(6))(O)
Equation (2.7) shows that for 6 )6condition (2.3) holds.
Since h(q(8))(9) is a non—decreasing function of 8 ,itmust be con-
tinuous almost everywhere in °o' .Thus,if we divide by (6 —6)
and take the limit as 8 •8we get:
ds(8)-h(q(8))(O)
Integrating this equation gives condition (2.2). Condition (2.1)
is just condition (1.3) and condition (2.4) is implied by condition
(1.2).
Next we show that conditions (2.l)—(2.4) imply conditions (1.1)—
(1.3).
As condition (1.2) is implied by conditions (2.2) and (2.4), it
only remains to show that conditions (2.2) -and (2.3) imply condition
(1.1).
Using condition (2.2) gives,
s(8) -s(8/8)-s(8)+fh(q(e))(e)dO -s(&/8)










By condition (2.3) h(q(6))4(e) isnon—decreasing, and this expression
mustbe non—negative. If 8 ( 0
s(6)—s(8/0) —Jh(q(e))4(8)d6 + (8 —8)h(q(efl(e)
0
Again, by condition (2.3) this expression is non—negative.
The next lemma derives an expression for profits whentheforeign
monopolist is faced with a specific and an ad—valorem tariff at the
rates m and t ,respectively.As a quota Implemented by selling
import licenses acts like a specific tariff, the effects of a specific
tariffmay be equated with those of a quota. (See Krishna 0.984) for details).
Lemma 2.2:ForanyfeasibleOutcome function, the profit f.mction of
themonopolist faced with an ad—valorem tariff at the rate t and a
specific tariff at rate m is given by:—10-
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Substitutingback into equation (2.9) and collecting terms proves
Leema2.2.
Theoptimal outcoee fmction for the monopolist when s(O) is non—
decreasing in 8 is now apparent.
5
Theorem 2.1: Assume that z(6)is non-decreasing in 0andthat
(2,11)z(O)h"(q(6))+g"(q(8))(1—t) —c"(q(6))< 0 6 [es,1]
andiq(.)
Thenthe optimal feasible outcome function is givenby <q*(6), p*(e),












Proof: Equation (2.8)is maximized by setting a(6) at its lowest
feasible value, zero. The integral in (2.8) is of a simple formand is
maximized bysetting q*(0) to maximize the terms incurlybrackets for-12—
eache ,andgiving the value 1 to ,*(8) if the maximized value is
positive, and zero otherwise. The aestsaption that z'($)0 ensures
that v'(O) is0 as the envelope theor shows thatv'(O) —
b'(q*(e))z'(e).Thedefinition of $*(8) ensures that those terms
makinga positivecontribution to the integral, are included withas





q*(8) is non—decreasing in 8 given the assumptions of the theorex.
Thus, •*(8)h(q*(e)) is non—decreasing in 8 ,andcondition (2.3) is
met. As p*(O) is defined using condition (2.2), this condition is
automatically satisfied. Thus, the outcome function constructed is both
feasible and optimal.
It is instructive to compare the monopolist's choice when he can
costlessly identify consers by their types to the situation we have
been studying, where he cannot do so. In the former case, he could
charge each type of consinner the entire utility derived from any
quality. Thus, as is usual with a perfectly discriminating monopolist,
the quality assigned to each type of conster uldbeoptimal, butthe
monopolist iuld appropriate the entire surplus. In this case the mono-
polist uldsetqM(O)tomaximizeu(8,q)—c(q),anduld serve
theconstmerof type 8 if u(8,qM(O)) -c(qM(O))> 0 •Thisis exactly
the assignment a planner with perfect and costless information u1d-13-
make,by pricing at marginal cost.
In this case, qM($) is determined by:
(2.14) eh(qM(e)) + g(qM(8)) —ct(qM(O))—0
Comparing (2,12) to this (with t —m0) shows that z(8) plays the
se role in (2.12) as 8 does in (2.14). Thus, z(8) —8
can be thought of as the implicit cost borne by the monopolist because
of his inability to directly identify constmiers by their types.
Nov return to the analysis of the profit maximizing outcome
function for the monopolist. If z(8) is not monotonic, the solution
outlined in Theorem 1 does not meet condition (2.3), and is therefore
•not feasible. In order to derive the optimal policy In this case we
need more machinery. We will construct a function T(6) from z(O)
which is nnotonIc and is, in a way, closest to z(6),andshow that it
plays the same role as z(8)
Let L() be a function defined over the interval [0,1] .£is
constructed from z as follows:
Thus, if at a given 8 —0,asthe value of z is z(8) ,thesame
value will be assigned to the ntmber F(8) by the function £ .(This
is Illustrated in DIagram 1.) Define:
L(*)fL(*)dp
0
Let t()bethe greatest convex function that lies belowL($) onthe
interval 18o'°i1 .Leti(*)bethe slope of t(). Nowlet i(8)—, 14—
i(F(8)). )tice that the construction of z(0)ensuresthat z(6) is
made up of segments of (6) connected by flat portions, and that (8)
isnon-decreasingin in 8 ,asportrayed in Diagram 1.
The following lemma (due to Myerson (1981)) is of use in deriving
the optimal policy.
Lemma 23: Define 0(8) —L(F(8))—t(F(8)) .0(6)is a continuous
non—negative function. (8) is a non-decreasing function and is
locally constant if 0(0) > 0 •If0(8) 0 ,thenz(8) —1(e)




for any inotone function A(8)
Proof: i1y the last statement need to be proved as the others are
apparent by the construction of these functions.








Integrating by parts yields:—15—
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Thelast equality follows because L(80)t(80) and L(e1)1(e1) as
the convex hull of a continuous function always equals the function at
t,he end points of the domain in R
Now we can use Lemma 2.3 and condition (2.3) to rewrite equation




This is possible because feasibility implies h(q(0))(O) is a non—
decreasing function so that h(q(8))(8) can be used in place of A(O)
The profit maximizing outcome function is aow apparent.
Theorem 2.2: The optimal outcome function is derived as in Theorem 2.1
whenz(8) is replaced by •(8) .Letthisbe denoted by <p*(0),
q*(e),+*(8)>.
Proof: This choice of q(0) maximizes the value of thefirstintegral in 2.15
by arguments identical to those of Theorem 2.1. In addition, as i(8) is—16-
non—decreasing, condition (2.3) is automatically met.Thevalue of the
second integral mist be non—negative. If q(8) is chosen to maximize
thefirst integral, the value of the second integral is sero whichis
its lowest possible value. (This is ensured as h[q*(8)J*(O) is
locally constant whenever C(S) is positive and whenever h[q*(8)]4>*(8)
is increasing, C(S)iszero.) isset at zero, whichisits
lowestvalue.This concludes the proof.
SomecomparIsonsof the monopoly outcome and the outcome under com-
petition are rth noting. These results are due to ?ssa and Rosen
(1978), though the proofs differ. They are provided for the sake of
completeness.
Theorem 2.3: (Nussa and Rosen (1978)) A comparison of the monopolist's
quality choice, to that under competition shows:
(1) The monopolist assigns a lower quality to each type of
constnerserved in both markets,
(2)The same quality is assigned in bothmarketsto the consumer
of type Si
(3) The monopolistserves asmallermarket than under competition.
(Proof in the appendix.)
liaving characterizedtheprofitmaximizingoutcomefunction, are
ina position to evaluatethe effectsof specificandad—valorsm
tariffs on the quality cice of the monopolist. This is thetopicof
the next section.—17-
ction 3
Specif Ic and M—Valorem Tariffs
The imposition of an ad—valorem tariff, or a quota Implemented by
the sale of licenses, which acts like a specific tariff, changes the
profit maximizing policy of the monopolist. In the previous section,
we derived the monopolist's profit function over feasible outcome func-
tions. This had built into it the parameters "tand "ni" which
represented a uniform ad—valoreni tariff and specific tariff on goods of
all qualities. From this we calculated the monopolist's optimal
policy.
Considerthe profit function, fl(ni,t)whenthe specific tariff
"ni"andad—valorem tariff "t" is imposed.
81




Whatever be the level of niort ,thelast term is Identically
equal to zero as G(9)dh(q(6))$(8) is equal to zero for each 8 in
[80,81] whenthemonopolist maximizes profits over the set of feasible
policies. The effect of changing in or t on the profit maximizing
policy may becalculatedby deriving the effect, of changesina and
t,onthevalue of the optimal feasible q(e), q*(0).Theeffectson
price and on custors served, of changes in inandt can be derived—18-
from the effects on q*(e) ,andusing the characterization of the opti—
*al policy in terms of q*(8) as provided by Theor 2.2.
In order to simplify the notation in what follows, I define 8* as
the lowest type of constzner served, and use it to drop the variable •(8)
from the expression previously derived. 8* is defined by equation
(3.2) below.
(3.2){h(q*(8*))'(8*) + g(q*(8*))](l_t) —c(q*(8*))—
m}—
whereq*(8) is the optimal choice of q on the part of the monopolist,
and where
(3.3) [h'(q*(6))z(0) + g'(q*(0))](l.t) —c'(q*(O))—0
defines q*(0)
An examination of equation (3.3) reveals that q*(6) does not
depend on in, onlyon t .Recognizingthis dependence, define
q*(0,t) to capture it. Similarly, 8* depends on both inand
as shown by equation (3.2) and the properties of 8*(m,t) may be
derived by using this equation. In addition, p*(e) is defined by:
8
(3.4) p*(e)8h(q*(0)) +g(q*(8))—J h(q*(8))de
8*(m,t)
p* is affected by both inandt •Because inonlyaffects 0* ,and
not q* ,thechange inprice due to a change in inisa constant,
independent of 8 •ThisIs not the case when t changes, as both q*
and 8* change in this case. The function p*(m,t) is implicitly
defined by equation (3.4).—19-
Atechnicalproblem needs to be taken care of before the effect of
pareter changes on the solution can be calculated. If the maximized
value of profits gained by serving type 0 ,whenrestricted to
feasible policies, is zero, or,
[h(q*(0))(0) + g(q(0))](1t) —c(q*(0))—inv(8)—0
for an interval of 9's ,say(0,T) ,thenthe monopolist is indif-
ferent between serving the constners between 0 and .Ifsame con—
_____3t__ ——— It •iiie&u LFLLS region re eervea, negets irger mareLnaIILL none
are served, but because p(O) is determined by equation (3.4), he has
to charge a lower price. In this case a continui.mi of equilibria exist
and it is not possible to estimate the effect of changing parameters,
as this depends on which equilibriim is taken as the initial point. I
will asste that •(9) —0unless v(6) is positive. This means that
in such cases, Tistaken as the initial point. Thus, for increases
in in, i'(O*(m))is by definition not equal to zero. We are now in
a position to determine the effects of an increase in in,ort
Theorem 3.1: An increase in inhasthe following effects:
(1)It leaves the quality assigned to all types of consiers, who
remainin the market, unaffected.
(2)It reduces the size of the market by raising 9*
(3) It increases price for eachquality by a uniform amount.
Proof: The first point is apparent as equation (3.3) defines q* for
every value of 0 .Equation(3.2) defines 0* for each a and t
Implicitly differentiating it gives:—20—.
dO* 1
(3.5) —(m,t) — >0 dm
Note that the first t pointsimplythat average quality mustrise,
aseachq*(8) is unaffected by m ,q*(e)is non—decreasing in S
andasconsiners with low 0's are eliminated from the market.
Differentiating equation (3.4), wtdchdefinesp*(e)foreach value of
m and t gives
d* d8* 1 (3.6) _E__(0.t) —h(o*(0*(m.t)))----4mt) dm dm z'(6*(m,t))
-
whichis a positive constant independent of 0 •Itfollows that
surplus for each type of Sfalls as well,
Theorem3.2: kiincreasein t has the following effects:
(1) The quality assigned to each type of conser remaining
in the market falls.
(2) The size of the market falls.
(3) The surplus associated with each type of conser remaining
in the market falls.
Proof: The effect on q*(0) of an increase in t is obtained by dif—
ferentiating equation (3.3). This shows that,
(3.7) dq*(9,t)— h'(q*(0,t))i(8)+ g'(g*(e,t)) < o
dt [{h"(q*(B,t))z(8) + g(q*(e,t))}(1t) —c(q*(9,t))]
as the ninerator is equal to by (3.3) and the denoinator is nega-
tive by a2sption. 0* is determined by equation (3.2). Differen-
tiating this gives:—21—
(3.8) de*(,t)h(q*(8*))T(e*) g(g*(6*))> dt '(O*)(i—t)
Using equation (3.4) shows that,
dB(O)—_h(q*(e*)) f h'(q*(e))dg*(O,t)d6 < 0
O*(in,t)
so surplus mustfall.!btice also that the fall in surplus is increasing
In 6
Notethatit Is notpossIbleto say that the price paid by each
type rises, as the quality assigned to each type also falls,However,
as surplus falls for each 6 ,theprice assigned to each quality must
rise. The effect on average quality of an Increase in tIsunclear.
The Increase in t lowers the quality purchased by each conser
remaining in the market. This lowers average quality. However, con—
sers with low values of 8 ,whobuy low quality products, leave the
-market,and this raises average quality.
Even though conser surplus falls as m or t rise, It could be
In the interests of national lfare to levy such taxes if value of the
gain in revenue was larger than the value of the loss in consner surplus.
The conditions under which this is likely are investigated next.—22—
Section 4
Welfare Effects
In this section I will consider the effect of a saall ad—valorem
or specific tariff on ie1fare when the initial situation is that of free
trade. Thus, the initial levels of t and inareset at zero.
In the previous section, the assumption made (which is maintained
throughout) was that revenue raised by the government is either returned
to consumers in alump sumfashion or that the goverruent acts likea
separateconsumer withtheutility function given by revenue raised.
The existence of a numeraire good ensures that lump sum transfers do not
affectdemand.
Making this assumption, the national welfare function is given by:
(4.1) W(m,t) f{[u(e,q(6))—p(O)J+ R(t,m,O)}f(6)d8
0*(m,t)
where R(t,tn,9) is the revenue raised by the government,fromthe con-
sumer of type 0•Totalrevenue is given by summingR(t,m,0)over




and is the utility derived by the government.
I will onlyconsiderthe effect on welfare of raising t or in
fromzero. If only inisraised, welfare is given by:
W(m) f[s(6)+ m]f(8)dO—23—
Usingcondition (1.6) •(0) —0,andintegrating by parts gives:
01 e
W(m) f[ fh(q*(8))dO]f(e)de + [1—p'(e*())]
0*(m) O*(m)







(4.2) W(m) —f(1F(e))h(q*(e))de + mEl -.F(e*(m))J
Differentiatingthe above and using equation (3.5) yields:
(4.3) dW(m)_ [1 -F(O*(m))][i * _____
— [l—F(8*(m))][i — }. z'(8*(m))
Whenthe monopolist wasindifferentbetween serving and not serving
agroup of consers, we asstned he did not serve them. This means that
for increases in m ,
— z'> 0and
(44) dW(m)— — F(9*(m))][Z'(B*(rn))_1]
11—F(9*(ni))][f(e*)2 + (l—F(O*))f'(e*)J
f(8*) ('(0*) dW(m) Thus,
l—F(0*)
> —f(0*) dm>-24--
Equation (4.3) is easy to interpret. It rely States thatwelfare
rises if the loss in welfare due to higher prices falls short of the
revenue extracted by the tax.Asthe magnitude of both these terms is
independent of 0 ,theeffect on a given conser maybeblown up by
the ni.miber of constaers served (1 —P(8*)).Whatis different about
this result from the standard results on incidence of a tax, is that the
incidence is identified with the distribution of the characteristic 0
The parameter 8 is often thought of as being associated with income.
The distribution of 0 mightthusbe thought to be related to the
Pareto or log—normal distributions. f(8*) would then be positive if
8*was relatively low. This interpretation of 8 would suggest that
using a specific tax on a foreign monopolist who produces a range of
qualities, and serves mostofthe population would be beneficial, while
taxing a monopolist serving the upper endof the market wouldnot.







Using equation (3.5) and integrating the second termbyparts gives
ei
(4.6)W(t) —f{[8t4- + tg(q*(8,t))} f(8)dO
8*(t)—25—
Notice thatWdepends on t in three ways.First,thereis the
direct effect of t ;second, there is the effect via changesin








dq*(e t) d8*(t) The expression for
dt
' (whichis (0)and
dt (which is 0)
aregiven by equations (3.7) and (3.8), respectively. The first term in
the expression is the direct effect on welfareviathe ad—valorem
tariff t •Itis positive as z(e)canbe replaced by i(O)inthe
above integral by using Leia 2.3 and Theor 2.2. As v(8) is non-
negative for all 8 greater than or equal to O*(t) ,thefirst term in
the above expression must be positive. The second term in the expres-
sion is the effect of welfare via induced changes in q(O,t) of an
increase in t ,andis negative as q falls as it rises, The third
term is the effect on welfare via the change in the market served. This
is again negative. The overall effect is ambiguous.—26—
Conclusion
Although the effects of trade restrictions with endogenous quality
have been previously studied, the specification of the structures
analyzed have been particularly suited to the paradigm of perfect
competition.
Inan iAperfecCly competitive world, a large number of questions
arise which do not have corresponding analogues in a competitive world.
In order to study such questions, it is important to develop simple
models to capture, possible in isolation, the factors which mightbe
important in answering such questions. This paper is to be viewed as
an attempt at doing justthis.
This paper analyzed the effect of trade restrictions on the product
line. A nopolist who produces a line of products will price them jointly
so as to extract the maximum profit from the whole market. He will be
limited in how much surplus he can extract, by the fact that he cannot
perfectly price discriminate since he cannot identify consumers by their
"types"
In this paper I have tried to see whether the analysis of a simple
model, capturing this stylized fact, leads to any predictions about the
behavior of such a foreign monopolist when faced with a specific or ad—
valorem tariff, and what policy prescriptions might be derived for such
situations.
However, to the extent that variety is expensive, a producer would
try and target a product to groups of consumers as discussed in Krishna
1984. As shown there, protection has different effects on such a model.—27 —
Futureresearch might be directed to analyzing such questions in less
simple market structures, and in a unified framework where the existence
of product sped.fic fixed costs would limit the number of products offered.—28-.
Appendix
Theorem2.3: (Mtmaa and Rosen (1978)) A comparison of the monopolist's
qualitychoice, to that under competition shows that when V(Fi,q) is
concavein q for all e:
(1)The monopolist assigns a lower quality to each type of
conster served in both markets,
(2)The same quality is assigned in both markets to theconsner
of type 8ii
(3) The monopolist serves a smaller market than under conpetition.
Proof: (This uses the characterization of the monopoly solution pro-
vided in Theorem 2.2, by setting tm —0.)
(1)The competitive quality assignment is given by qC(6) ,and
the lowest 8 served by O .Theseare defined by
ehe(qC(e)) + g?(qC(9)) —c(qC(8)) 0
and
8h(q (0 ))+g(q (9 ))— c(q(9))— V(0)0
respectively.(V(0) =V(0,qC(8))jqthesurolus of theconsumer of
type 0 under competition.) The quality assignments under monopoly are
the solutions q*(0) ,9*,to:
i(e)h'(q*(O)) + g(q*(8)) —c'(q*(O))0
and
(O'h(q*(8) + g(q*(0*)) —c(q*(8*))v(8*)0— 29—
v(8)is defined in the text.v(0,q) =(0)h(q)+ g(q) —c(q)and
v(o,q*(o))=v(8)is itsvaluefi.niction. Notice that by definition,
z(0) ￿ 0 .Also,note that as(8) consists of increasing segments
of z(0) ,connectedby flat portions, z(8) ￿ 0 .This,combined
with the definitions of qc(e),q*(e) together with the asst.nnptions made
in Theorems 2.1, 2.2 on the concavity of v(e,q) in q for all 8 proves (1).
(2) Note that for 8 close to 81, z'(8) must be positive.
This means that L(*) is convex about i =1.Therefore,
t'(p)L'(p) aroundi, —1,and80 (8) z(0) for 0 close
to 01 .Butas 0 gets close to 1 z(0) approaches 8•As
z(0) ( i(0)8forall 8 close to 6i ,i(0)mustapproach 8




Then 6C8* and (3) is true.
—0%(qC(8C))+ g(qC(8C) —c(qC(OC))=0
AsV(85is the maximized value of V(OC,q)
C C * C
0h(q*(e ))+g(q (8))— c(q*(6))￿0
As(8C) ￿
(85h(q*(05)+ g(q*(e*)) —c(q*(85)￿0
Hence, V(8C) < 0-30-
Footnotes
1See kanderand Spencer (1982) on this possibility aswellas
Dixit (1983) for a discusøion of recent work on trade policy in oligopo—
listic markets.
2The tendency is for the monopolist to produce lowerquality goods,
comparedto competition so as to extract more surplus from consi.ers who
havegreater willingness to pay. lips (1983, pp. 215—216)points out
thatthe idea is not a new one:
As for the relationship between quality choices and price
discrimination, I know of only three references. The first
one is a fascinating remark made by IXipuit in his discussion of
railroad tariffs for passenger traffic. The following excerpt,
taken from Ekelund, introduces the idea of a reduction in
quality (of the lower—quality goods) as a market segmentation
technique:
It is not because of the fewthousandfrancs which would
haveto be spent to put a roof over the third—class
carriages or to upholster the third—class seats that
some company or other has open carriages with wooden
benches...What thecompany is tryingto do is to prevent
thepassengers whocanpay the second—class fare from
traveling third—class; ithitsthe poor, not becauseit
wantstohurt them, but to frighten the rich... And it
isagain for the seme reason that the companies, having
proved almost cruel to third—class passengers and mean to
second—class one, become lavish in dealing with first—
class passengers. Raving refused the poor what is
necessary,theygive therichwhat is superfluous. [1979,
p.275]
Dupuitdid not work out an analytical solution to the problen,
nordid Ekelund."
Later work includes that of Maskin and Riley (1982) who point out
the similarities in various adverse selection problems.—31--
A special caseof this ight be when
h(q)e+ g(q) —(aj+ b1q) + (a2 + b2q)e
so that the functions h(q), g(q) are linear. The specification I use
is not really much more general as the curvature of h(q) is limited by
se'cond order conditions to be fairly small. !bwever, this specification
is used as it is notationally more convenient, and is slightly more
general. P&issa and Rosen assiane that u(e ,q) —
SIfg and h are linear this condition is automatically met.
This condition restricts the curvature of h(q),andthis is why the
specification is not really much more general than that of Mussa and
Rosen.
6
ist be less than one for the producer to want to produce.32—
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